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NOTES
ADVERTISING BY PUBLIC UTILITIES AS AN
ALLOWABLE EXPENSE FOR RATEMAKING:
ASSAULT ON MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE
INTRODUCTION

Formerly, advertising' by public utilities ' was widely regarded
as a proper and beneficial activity. Advertising was considered
necessary in order to stimulate the demand required to support
large-scale and efficient utility industries.' The prerogative of utility
management to advertise as they pleased, within reasonable limits,
was constitutionally protected.'
In recent years, this solicitous attitude towards utility advertising has evaporated. Because advertising is a highly visible corporate
activity, it is a natural target for criticism and recommendations for
greater regulation. 5 Utilities have become a focal point for consumer
resistance to rising costs, the national policy of energy conservation,
and concern for the environment.' These pressures have found ex1. Advertising has been defined as "any paid form of nonpersonal presentation and promotion of goods, services, or ideas by an identified sponsor." R. STANLEY,
PROMOTION 160 (1977). This note does not include consideration of such topics as promotional rates, merchandising operations, lobbying, or charitable contributions.
2. Public utilities are defined here as those privately owned businesses subject to rate regulation which are characterized as natural monopolies. See generally
Posner, Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Natural Monopoly]. This includes primarily the telephone, gas, and electric industries, as well as some privately-owned water utilities. Excluded are utilities which
are publicly owned, or transportation industries such as trucking which are regulated
to operate as cartels.
3. See, e.g., Wichita Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 126 Kan. 220, 268 P.
111 (1928). The economic rationale is that these industries are characterized by great
economies of scale and depend on growth of the economy and of demand to reduce

their own costs and prices. 1 A.

KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND

INSTITUTIONS 11 (1970).

4.

West Ohio Gas Co. v. Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm'n (No. 1), 294 U.S. 63 (1935).
R. STANLEY, supra note 1, at 182.
6. See generally Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concer" Structural
Change in the Process of Public Utility Regulation, 17 J.L. & ECON. 291 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Inflation and Environmental Concern].
5.
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pression in' the treatment of advertising expenses by state
regulatory commissions. In the process, the discretion of utility
management to advertise has been severely curtailed.7
This note examines the question of whether state commissions,
in their control of advertising expenses, have assumed powers to
which they are not legally entitled. There can be no doubt that
modern commission decisions advance important public policies and
conscientiously seek to serve the public interest. There remains,
however, the larger question of the appropriate restraints on the expansion of bureaucratic authority. Specifically, regulatory commissions are ignoring long-established constitutional principles which
explicitly protect the right of utilities to advertise. It is arguable
that these principles are directly contravened by recent commission
decisions. It is also questionable whether the policies that commissions are pursuing have any nexus with the purpose of rate regulation, and therefore fall within the statutory jurisdiction of the commission. Even assuming that the current assault on management's
prerogative to advertise is beneficial to the general welfare, it
should not occur without serious consideration of these issues.
The control of advertising costs will initially be treated from
the overall perspective of two basic principles. The first of these is
the purpose of ratemaking legislation as a device to prevent the
monopolistic exploitation of consumers. The second is the constitutional requirement that an advertising expense not be arbitrarily
disallowed. The requirement that advertising costs be reasonable is
then examined as it has been applied in a manner consistent with
these principles. Finally, the more recent incorporation of broad
social goals and value judgments into the criteria for allowing advertising expenses, and the unresolved legal problems posed by this
development, are analyzed.
One must first understand the context in which these issues
arise. Ratemaking occurs when a utility applies to the regulatory
commission for a rate increase. As a part of the procedure, the commission staff reviews the expenses of the firm during a selected test
year.' If an expense is approved by the commission, it will be incor7. See, e.g., In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 56 Hawaii 260, 535 P.2d 1102 (1975).
8. For a uniquely candid commentary on the "murky" state of the law in this
area, see the concurring opinion of Chairman Cudahy in Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 9
P.U.R.4th 204, 219-20 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
9. For a brief description of the entire ratemaking process, see Natural
Monopoly, supra note 2, at 592-93. A more extensive analysis may be found in 1 A.
KAHN, supra note 3, at 25-56.
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porated into the rate structure and ultimately passed along to consumers. 0 Technically, the ratemaking process does not determine
whether the company may incur an expense.1 It only determines
whether the company's customers must continue to pay for it. As a
practical matter, the utility will be unlikely to continue incurring an
expense for which it cannot be reimbursed.
The decision to allow or disallow an advertising expense must
be considered in light of the original purpose behind regulating the
rates of public utilities. The central theme offered here is that
regulatory commissions are now disallowing advertising expenses
for reasons which are unrelated to the principal function of ratemaking. That function is to prevent the utility from exploiting its
monopolistic position to the detriment of consumers and the public
at large. It is necessary first to consider the relationship between
monopoly power and the wasteful spending which can occur when
that power is regulated.
ADVERTISING EXPENSE CONTROL AND THE FUNCTION OF RATEMAKING

It is universally recognized that the goal of ratemaking is to
impose controls which will simulate the results which would have occurred if the firm were subject to the pressures of competition. 3
This objective has, on occasion, been judicially acknowledged."

10. An allowable expense is often referred to as "above the line."
11. Attempts to directly censor or prohibit certain types of utility advertising
have not survived first amendment challenges. See Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844
(2d Cir. 1974); State v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 536 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1975); Utility
Advertising, No. 76-467 (Or. Pub. Util. Comm'r July 19, 1976).
12. E.g., Honolulu Gas Co., 36 P.U.R.3d 309 (Hawaii Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1960).
13. "[T]he single most widely accepted rule for the governance of the
regulated industries is regulate them in such a way as to produce the same results as
would be produced by effective competition, if it were feasible." 1 A. KAHN, supra note
3, at 17. See also 1 A.J.G. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 1-2
(1969).
While the objective of regulation is not controversial, there is no such agreement as to whether rate regulation can achieve this goal. For a sample of the
debate, see Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of
Government- Regulation, 15 J.L. &e ECON. 151 (1972); Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Regulation,
17 J.L. & ECON. 291 (1974); Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,
19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MAN.
SCI. 22 (1971); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MAN.
SCI. 3 (1971).
14. The Supreme Court explicitly recognized this in Cantor v. Detroit Edison,
428 U.S. 579, 595-96 (1976).
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The substitution of regulatory controls for the restraints of the
marketplace arises from the belief that certain industries are
natural monopolies. This means that a single firm is intrinsically
capable of capturing an entire market. These industries are
characterized by enormous initial capital investment. Once that investment is made, a single firm can service an entire market at an
average unit cost which will continuously decrease as the firm
grows. An established firm therefore has an advantage which effectively forecloses market entry by competititors. 1
A variety of evils are believed to attend uncontrolled monopoly
enterprise. Among these is the ability of the monopolist to exploit
his position by charging higher prices than would occur if the firm
were subject to competition."6 As a result, the firm is able to
preempt some of the welfare gains which would normally accrue to
consumers in a free market." Preventing such monopoly profit is
one of the primary goals of rate regulation." The commission sets a
rate of return to invested capital which it believes is fair. The price
of utility service is designed to allow only that rate of return. 9
Where the profits of the firm are controlled, the danger exists
that the firm will convert monopoly profits into excessive costs. The
regulated firm need not worry about more efficient competitors
because it has a legally protected exclusive franchise. There is no incentive to economize on costs in order to make a greater profit
because the rate of return is controlled.' ° The owners or managers
of a utility may therefore spend more money than they would if the
15. 2 A. KAHN, supra note 3, at 116-26. In economic terms, a natural monopoly
exists when the firm faces declining unit costs over the entire extent of the market
because of economies of scale which are internal to the firm. Id. at 119. See also A.
ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION, THEORY IN USE 427 (1969).
16. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN. supra note 15. This is particularly true where,
as with utilities, a great deal of the demand is believed to be inelastic. See 2 A. KAHN,
supra note 3, at 102. See also Natural Monopoly, supra note 2, at 550-51. Posner treats
all of the supposed evils of monopoly enterprise. Monopoly pricing is only one of these.
Others, such as reduced production and the threat of price discrimination, abound.
They do not bear directly on the issue of utility advertising. Posner's analysis concludes that rate regulation to control monopoly enterprise is not justified.
17. Id.
18. Id. The courts refer more ambiguously to the necessity of protecting consumers from high prices. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591,
611-12 (1944); State ex reL North Carolina Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 254 N.C. 536, 119
S.E.2d 469 (1961).
19. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 3, at 35-54, offers a discussion and analysis of the
principles and problems involved in regulating the level of profit allowed to the firm.
20. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 15, at 428.
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firm were subject to competition.2 Such wasteful spending will
ultimately be passed along to consumers. It may occur as a result of
simple indifference, or because the spending adds to the personal
wealth or power of the people who authorize it.'
The regulatory commission therefore must control expenditures as well as profits. Advertising is only one of the expense accounts which the commission must superintend. Wasteful advertising costs, like excessive profits, are a form of monopolistic exploitation." The ultimate objective in reviewing these expenditures is to
prevent those costs which would not have been incurred if the firm
were subject to the pressures of a normal marketplace."
Of course, other objectives are possible or even desirable as an
element of commission control over utility advertising. However, the
only apparent justification for rate regulation in these industries lies
with the threat of a natural monopoly exploiting its advantage to
the detriment of consumers and the public. There is otherwise no
reason to control utility advertising and not that of other large and
important industries.
It is clear from the foregoing that ratemaking legislation arises
from economic rather than legal principles. Because ratemaking has
long been recognized as a legislative function, courts are unconcerned about the objectives sought and will not intervene unless regulation has expanded to the point of confiscation or the utility has been
5
denied due process of law.1
As a result, judicial formulations of the ratemaking function
employ ambiguous legal terms that have no independent
significance. State regulation is authorized when the business is affected with a public interest. ' The commission is viewed as having
the task of setting rates which balance the public interest in
reasonable service at a fair price against the right of private owners
to a fair return on their investment.' The court will not question
21. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 3, at 26-35.
22. Id. See also Natural Monopoly, supra note 2, at 601-02.
23. See Natural Monopoly, supra note 2, at 601-02.
24. An unregulated firm seeking to maximize its profits would be expected to
spend money on advertising until the marginal revenue product of the advertising was
equal to the combined marginal cost of advertising and production. See Wilder, Public
Utility Advertising: Some Observations,49 LAND ECON. 458 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Utility Advertising].
25. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
26. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
27. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
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the theory applied by the commission, as long as the result is within
the zone of reasonableness between these interests and is not unjust.28 In the area of expense control, the commission has the duty of
preventing consumers from being burdened with unnecessary or extravagant costs.2
The commission does not have complete discretion in achieving
these objectives. There are constitutional limits to the scope of
regulatory control over utility advertising.
LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON REGULATORY REVIEW
OF ADVERTISING EXPENSES

Despite the necessity of preventing a regulated firm from
burdening consumers with wasteful costs, the regulatory commission lacks uncontrolled authority to supervise a utility's advertising
policy. It is settled that the fourteenth amendment prohibits state
regulation from intruding on private rights to the extent that property is confiscated" or due process of law is denied. 1 Attempting to
determine the point at which constitutional rights are offended is
the only concern of courts which intervene in the ratemaking pro2
3

cess.

Early decisions by both state and federal courts established the
principle that discretion to advertise is an incident to the management of private business which could not be arbitrarily abused by
state regulation.' The purpose of a regulatory commission is to
regulate rates, not to manage the business.' Management discretion
regarding advertising extends to both the amount of the expense
and the content of the advertising message. 5
Moreover, a simple showing that management may have made
a mistake concerning the amount spent on advertising was held insufficient to justify usurping their managerial function. Rather, "the
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
Kan. 1930);
(E.D. Mich.
111 (1928).
34.
35.

Id.
Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426 (1936).
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, supra note 25.
Id.
See Wichita Gas Co. v. Kansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 3 F. Supp. 722 (D.
Monroe Gas Light & Fuel Co. v. Michigan Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 11 F.2d 319
1926); Wichita Gas Co. v. Kansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 126 Kan. 220, 268 P.
Monroe Gas Light & Fuel Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, supra note
Id.
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constitutional guaranty is not to be avoided merely because management is less than perfect. As to all disbursements actually made
within the limits of good faith, the managers' discretion must stand,
unless it is abused."' The Constitution therefore requires some
leeway for error on the part of utility management, so long as the
error is made in good faith and does not involve gross inefficiency.
The Supreme Court adopted this viewpoint in West Ohio Gas
Company v. Ohio Public Utilities Commission (No. 1).," The commission had disallowed advertising expenses incurred by the company
because the advertising had not visibly effected an expansion of the
business.' This was due in part to the depression and the high price
of gas.,being sold by the company. 9 The Supreme Court reversed,
emphasizing that the requirement of good faith on the part of
management does not authorize an unsupported attack on its
business judgment. 0 On the contrary, "good faith is to be presumed
on the part of the managers of a business. In the absence of a showing of improvidence, a court will not substitute its judgment for
theirs as to the measure of a prudent outlay."'" The commission had
failed to make any showing of such inefficiency or improvidence.
West Ohio did not grant utility management absolute authority
regarding its advertising outlays. Rather, Justice Cardozo's opinion
affirmed the right of the commission to disallow expenses where the
commission could establish, by direct or circumstantial evidence,
that the cost was the result of negligence or waste."2 The Court did
not indicate what would constitute such a cost, though the burden of
proof was clearly placed upon the state. 3
Some elaboration was offered by the Court a year later in a
case involving stockyard rates set by the Secretary of Agriculture."
There was evidence in the record both for and against the necessity
and wisdom of the costs incurred to acquire and maintain new
business. 5 The Court rejected the argument that advertising was
entirely a matter of management discretion, observing that "regula36. Id. at 325.
37. 294 U.S. 63 (1935).
38. West Ohio Gas Co., P.U.R.1933B 433 (Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1933).
39. I
40. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm'n (No. 1), supra note 37.
41. Id. at 72 (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 68.
43. Id.
44. Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426 (1936).

45. Id.
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1978

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 [1978], Art. 3

94

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW

[Vol.13

tion cannot be frustrated by a requirement that the rate be made to
compensate for extravagant or unnecessary costs for these or any
other purposes."" It was sufficient that the record contained
substantial support for the disallowance."7
While the West Ohio case is obviously dated, the principles
adopted there have often been restated and remain binding law.
Courts have not infrequently been called upon to restrain regulatory
commissions from arbitrarily disallowing advertising outlays." On
occasion, a commission has itself observed that it could not
regarding a prudent advertising policy for
substitute its judgment
'
that of management."
In a leading and relatively recent case, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts forcefully restated the principle of management's
prerogative to advertise.' Although the total amount spent for
advertising was not found unreasonable, the content of the advertising had been attacked by the commission as being merely institutional advertising designed to foster public goodwill towards the
firm.5 ' The court rejected the commission's attempt to rule upon the

value of the advertising message:
46. Id at 431.
47. Id
48. City of El Dorado v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 235 Ark. 812, 362
S.W.2d 680 (1962); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 203 Ga. 832, 49
S.E.2d 38 (1948); Central Me. Power Co. v. Maine Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 153 Me. 228, 136
A.2d 726 (1957); New England Tel. & Tel. Co, v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., 360 Mass. 443,
275 N.E.2d 493 (1971); State ex reL Dyer v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 S.W.2d
795 (Mo. 1960); State ex reL N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 254 N.C.
536, 119 S.E.2d 469 (1961); State v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 536 P.2d 887 (Okla.
1975); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. R.R. & Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Tenn., 81 P.U.R.
(New Series) 571 (Tenn. App. 1948); In re New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 115 Vt. 494, 66
A.2d 135 (1949); General Tel. Co. of Wis. v. Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 46 P.U.R.3d
1 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1962).
Perhaps an extreme example of deference to management's prerogative to
advertise appears in State v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 211 Va. 758, 180 S.E.2d 675
(1971), affg Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 84 P.U.R.3d 1 (Va. State Corp. Comm'n 1970).
The commission refused to remove expenses for certain trade ally advertising from the
rate base even though the commission had previously disapproved of such advertising
and the company discontinued the program. It was reasoned that the company would
merely substitute some other promotional activity of equal or greater expense. Id.
49. See Kansas City Power & Light Co., 6 P.U.R.4th 321 (Kan. State Corp.
Comm'n 1974); Promotional Activities by Gas & Elec. Corps., 68 P.U.R.3d 162 (N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1967); Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. Columbus, 32 P.U.R. (New
Series) 321 (Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1939); New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 35 P.U.R.3d
100 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960).
50. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., 360 Mass. 443, 275
N.E.2d 493 (1971).
51. For the overruled commission decision, see New England Tel. & Tel. Co.,
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As a business corporation engaged in selling an important
service, the Company is entitled to take all reasonable
means to promote and to seek to enlarge that business.
One of the means used by almost all business corporations
is advertising .... It is no less entitled to advertise by
reason of the fact that it is a regulated public utility than
is the ordinary business corporation. The type and quantity
of such advertising, and the means, media or vehicle used
therefor are matters to be decided originally by the duly
authorized managers of the Company's business. They
must make the decision whether institutional type of
advertising is helpful to its business, and if so the amount
to be expended therefor.'
The opinion does not foreclose regulatory review of the
reasonableness of advertising costs. The court only interpreted
West Ohio as preventing the commission from disallowing an otherwise reasonable expense on the basis of a value judgment regarding
the content of the advertising message.
The concept that a commission's review of the reasonableness
of advertising expenses is limited to a consideration of the amount
spent, rather than the merit of the messages, did not originate with
the Massachusetts Supreme Court. Other courts have refused to
allow governmental supervision of advertising beyond the requirement that the dollar volume of the expense be reasonable."
It may be argued that the reasonableness of the expense
naturally depends on the value of the message being paid for. West
Ohio did not confront this precise issue, but it did prohibit
regulators from substituting their judgment for that of management
without a showing of inefficiency or improvidence." If an otherwise
reasonable expense may be disallowed because the commission finds
no social value in the advertising message, the Supreme Court's opinion is rendered meaningless. Any advertising expense can be
84 P.U.R.3d 130 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Utils. 1970). See also Brockton Edison Co., 86
P.U.R.3d 90 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Utils. 1970).
52. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., supra note 50, at 517.
53. "[W~e are not concerned with the particular purpose and amount of each
charge within the item. In general, promotional expense of the nature under discussion
may properly be charged to operation." Central Me. Power Co. v. Maine Pub. Utils.
Comm'n, 153 Me. 228, 136 A.2d 726, 736-37 (1957). See also State ex rel. Dyer v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 341 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1960). The advertising in Dyer included some that
was directed at the political issue of whether utilities should be publicly or privately
owned.
54. 294 U.S. at 72.
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disallowed if the commission need only find that the advertising has
no merit. Such a finding is merely a conclusory assumption, not a
showing of negligence or waste.
Furthermore, the concept of a reasonable advertising expense
should be consistent with the purpose of rate regulation. As long as
the advertising message is consistent with that of competitive
businesses, it is not an undesirable effect of the firm's monopolistic
advantage." This is true even where the advertising message contravenes an important public policy. For example, a utility may
ignore the policy in favor of energy conservation by attempting to
stimulate sales with the promotion of energy-consuming appliances.
There is no better reason to prevent such advertising by utilities
than by unregulated appliance dealers. In State v. Oklahoma Gas &
Elect7ic Co., the Supreme Court of Oklahoma indicated that not all
promotional advertising could be disallowed because of a desire to
conserve energy as long as the utility had the ability to serve the increased demand."
The position that the allowabiity of advertising should, pursuant to West Ohio, depend on its cost rather than its content has
rapidly eroded in recent years. Four state supreme courts have approved commission decisions which incorporate a review of the
social value of the advertising message into the determination of the
allowability of the expense. 51 These opinions make no attempt to
reconcile this approach with West Ohio. Thus the reasonableness of
advertising expenses has taken on two distinct meanings. The traditional meaning is consistent with existing constitutional precedent
and the acknowledged function of ratemaking in that it focuses on
whether the cost of the advertising is excessive.' The modern trend
is to determine whether the advertising message is of tangible
benefit to the consumer, or consistent with broad public policies."
Reasonableness has become a test to determine whether the content
of the advertising is desirable regardless of the cost of the program.
55. Thus, advertising which is a political attempt to influence the outcome of
a rate case is usually disallowed. See infra note 144.
56. 536 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1975).
57. Los Angeles v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 7 Cal. 3d 331, 497 P.2d 785, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 313 (1972); In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 56 Hawaii 260, 535 P.2d 1102 (1975); Illinois
Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 55 Ill. 2d 461, 303 N.E.2d 364 (1973); Public
Serv. Co. of N.H. v. State, 113 N.H. 497, 311 A.2d 513 (1973).
58. E.g., Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 82 P.U.R. (New Series) 341 (Ohio Pub. Utils.
Comm'n 1949).
59. E.g., In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., supra note 57.
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Before analyzing this trend, a review of reasonableness in the traditional sense of preventing wasteful spending is appropriate.

THE REQUIREMENT OF REASONABLENESS:
PREVENTING EXCESSIVE COSTS

Numerous considerations affect the determination of whether
an advertising expense has been excessive. These considerations
conform to the concept of reasonableness as a standard which
disallows costs in excess of those which would have been incurred if
the firm were subject to competition. Costs in excess of that standard are wasteful in that they are the product of the firm's
monopolistic advantage. Reasonableness in this sense does not involve any review of the value of the advertising message independent of cost.
Attempting to determine how a utility would act if it were
operating in a competitive environment is, of necessity, a task which
involves a great deal of judgment." Commissions have generally
relied on objective comparisons of a utility's advertising expense
with that of other utilities similarly situated, and on an evaluation of
market factors which would affect the willingness of a competitive
firm to advertise.
Objective Comparisons
The structural differences between utilities and more competitive businesses make direct comparisons between them of
limited significance."' Commissions have generally been confined to
comparing the advertising outlay of the firm in question with other
utilities. Logic supports this approach. If it may be supposed that
utilities in general will spend a reasonable amount on advertising,
then the expense of a firm which substantially exceeds the norm is
naturally suspect.
There is empirical evidence which suggests that utilities as a
group engage in reasonable advertising programs. Energy utilities
spend relatively little on advertising when compared with nonregulated industries.2 This data is consistent with the nature of
utility services. Energy, like all utility services, is a standardized
product for which consumers have limited informational needs.
Moreover, the firm has a limited ability to differentiate its product
60.
61.
62.

See Ohio Bell Tel. Co., supra note 58.
Utility Advertising, supra note 24, at 461.
Id
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through advertising, and the demand for energy is derived from the
consumer's primary demand for energy-using appliances. The low
level of advertising by energy utilities is therefore a reasonable
response to the market in which they operate.' Thus, there is at
least some reason to believe that the advertising expenses of
utilities generally conform to the expense level one would expect if
utilities were not monopolies.
Comparisons to determine if the advertising expense of an individual utility deviates from the industry norm must begin with
some measure of the intensity of advertising practiced by the firm.
Most often, the commission staff computes advertising intensity as
the percentage of advertising expense to gross revenue." Also
employed is the cost of advertising per customer during the test
year," and occasionally the percentage of advertising expense to all
other operating expenses.' It has been held that the commission is
not bound to prefer one measure over another.67 These calculations
of advertising intensity may be compared with figures for similar
local utilities," a sample of utilities nationwide," or a national
average"0 in order to determine if the expense is reasonable.
Viewing such data over a period of time may also provide
useful information. 1 A utility may attempt to exploit the regulatory
63. Ia
64. See, e.g., Southern Cal. Gas Co., 35 P.U.R.3d 300 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n
1960); Honolulu Gas Co., 86 P.U.R.3d 307 (Hawaii Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1970); Kansas
City Power & Light Co., 6 P.U.R.4th 321 (Kan. State Corp. Comm'n 1974); Southern
Union Gas Co., 12 P.U.R.4th 219 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975); National Fuel Gas
Distribution Corp., 17 P.U.R.4th 138 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976); Utah Power &
Light Co., 95 P.U.R. (New Series) 390 (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1952); Wisconsin
Natural Gas Co., 92 P.U.R.3d 164 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1971); Mountain States Tel.
& Tel. Co., 14 P.U.R.4th 149 (Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976).
65. See, e.g., Sierra Pacific Power Co., 7 P.U.R.4th 209 (Cal. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n 1960); Honolulu Gas Co., supra note 64; Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 95 P.U.R.3d
247 (Kan. State Corp. Comm'n 1972).
66. See Southern Cal. Gas Co., supra note 64; Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 8
P.U.R.4th 75 (Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974); Southern Union Gas Co., supra note 64.
67. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., supra note 64.
68. See Sierra Pacific Power Co., supra note 65; Southern Cal. Gas Co., supra
note 64; Honolulu Gas Co., 36 P.U.R.3d 309 (Hawaii Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1960); Kansas
Gas & Elec. Co., supra note 65; National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., supra note 64;
Wisconsin Gas Co., 99 P.U.R.3d 160 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973).
69. See Utah Power & Light Co., supra note 64.
70. See Wisconsin Gas Co., supra note 68; Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
supra note 64.
71. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 19 P.U.R.4th 1 (Kan. State Corp. Comm'n
1977); Kansas City Power & Light Co., 6 P.U.R.4th 321 (Kan. State Corp. Comm'n
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system by inflating its test year expenses in order to justify higher
rates." A commission can therefore disallow advertising expenses
which are shown to be abnormal or nonrecurring."
Several cases have demonstrated that these comparisons may
not be mechanically applied to work an unjust result. In New York
the commission held that it was unfair to compare the advertising
cost per customer of a gas utility with a combination gas-electric
company."' The commission recognized that advertising is naturally
less expensive for electricity customers, inasmuch as gas companies
"have a particularly heavy responsibility to promote conservation
and must keep the issue of safety prominent in the public's
awareness."75 Accordingly, the commission set the allowable cost per
customer at the average of gas-only New York utilities in the staff
sample."
The practice of viewing the company's advertising expense over
a period of time may also be abused. In Tennessee, the Court of Appeals reversed a commission decision disallowing a portion of,the expenses incurred in the post-war test year (1946) because it compared
unfavorably with figures for a pre-war year (1936). 7" The court based
its decision on West Ohio; there had been no further showing of extravagance, mismanagement, or an abuse of discretion. 8

1974); Public Utils. Comm'n v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 75 P.U.R.(New Series) 275
(Me. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1948).
72. See Public Utils. Comm'n v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., supra note 71.
73. See Pennsylvania Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Scranton Steam Heat Co., 34
P.U.R.3d 322 (Pa. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1960), where the contract with the advertising
agency had not been renewed after the test year. But see Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
supra note 71. In that case the advertising expense during the test year was thirtytwo per cent greater than the preceding year. The commission held that it was
allowable without a further showing by the staff that the advertising was of no benefit
to the customers of the company. Id. at 28. See also, New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 35
P.U.R.3d 100 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960).
74. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 17 P.U.R.4th 138 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1976).
75. Id. at 146-47. In fact, the tendency of combined gas and electric utilities to
advertise less than gas-only companies is probably due to the fact that they need not
compete with an alternative energy source, rather than a result of any particularly
heavy responsibility borne by gas suppliers. See notes 94-96 infra, and accompanying

text.
76.
77.
P.U.R.(New
78.

National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., supra note 74.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. R.R. & Pub. Utils. Comm'r of Tenn., 81
Series) 571 (Tenn. App. 1948).
Id. at 579.
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The commission staff is not always the party guilty of
generating unacceptable figures for the purpose of comparing advertising expenses. In one case the commission rejected the company's
data favorably comparing itself with utilities in neighboring states
that had a different regulatory scheme."9 The commission preferred
to rely on an overall national average as their basis of comparison.'
On the other hand, a decision by the North Carolina Public
Utilities Commission was overruled because they used a national
average as their basis of comparison without considering the specific
situation of the firm."' The gas retailer in that case had recently
made a heavy capital investment to convert from manufactured to
natural gas, and was anxious to promote sales in order to cover its
costs. There was intense competition in the area from retailers of
fuel oil and an electric utility. Moreover, the commission had made
no effort to find the average advertising intensity for companies in
this utility's class or territory.' Therefore, despite the fact that the
company's advertising cost per customer was almost three times the
national average," the court ruled that the expense must be allowed.
This decision also relied on West Ohio principles, and held that
management had acted within the limits of its discretion."
This North Carolina case further illustrates the fact that a commission may, in its determination of reasonableness, constructively
look to market factors which would affect the willingness of a competitive firm to advertise. The commission is not limited to comparative data in fulfilling its duty of protecting consumers from
monopolistic exploitation. On the contrary, where an allowance for
selling expenses was attacked because of imperfections in the comparative data, it was held sufficient that the regulatory agency had
attempted to compensate for the defects." The court observed that
"a lint-picking critique [of the statistics] will not serve to undermine
79.

Arkansas Power & Light Co., 13 P.U.R.3d 1 (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n

1956).
80. Id. at 16.
81. State ex reL Utils. Comm'n v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 254 N.C. 536,
119 S.E.2d 469 (1961).
82. Id. at 479-80.
83. Id.
84 Id. at 477.
85. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 385 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 944 (1968). This case dealt with an airline rather than a public utility
as defined here. See note 2 supra. The court, however, recognized that in this context
the analysis is comparable in that the regulation of airlines or utilities are both "intensely practical affair[sJ," and relied on precedents dealing with utilities. Id. at 658.
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a regulatory surveillance that has the hallmark of a conscientious effort merely because it cannot and does not purport to attain
anything like the refinement of a mathematical discipline."8 The
agency's action does not contravene West Ohio so long as it is supported by substantial evidence in the record.87 A commission may
clearly apply an element of informed judgment to its determination
of reasonableness.
Market Considerations
Factors other than objective comparisons may influence commission decisions regarding the level of advertising by the firm. The
factors treated here pertain only to the amount spent on advertising, and not directly to the content of the advertising message.
Even where the general prerogative of a utility to advertise is unchallenged, if it is doing so under circumstances inconsistent with
the level of advertising being carried on, the expense may be
disallowed as unreasonable. By the same token, if the market environment of the firm is such that would ordinarily encourage a firm
to advertise, the expense is more likely to be approved.
The most obvious consideration is the degree to which the firm
and its product are established in the market. Advertising is particularly useful as a mechanism for stimulating primary demand for
a new product or service," and for overcoming the resistance consumers display towards new ideas.89 Thus, some earlier decisions in
favor of utility advertising recognized the company's need for initial
market development." This is currently of little significance. Few
people today are unaware of the advantages or availability of utility
service.
86. Id. at 658.
87. Id. at 657.
88. "Advertising and publicity are of great importance in informing buyers of
the existence of the product and its qualities at a low cost per thousand people reached. If
the product is an entirely new concept, primary demand will have to be developed
before selective demand can take place." R. STANLEY, supra note 1, at 342. Primary demand is the demand for a general class of products or services, as opposed to selective
demand for a specific brand within the class. Id. at 169. Inasmuch as utilities have a
monopoly, selective demand is only important where there is a readily available
substitute for the monopolized service.
89. Id. at 1-2.
90. See Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Light Co., 92 P.U.R. (New Series) 133
(Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1952); Pennsylvania Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Pennsylvania
Power & Light Co., 14 P.U.R.3d 438 (Pa. Pub. Utils.-Comm'n 1956).
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The mere fact that a utility has a monopoly has repeatedly
been rejected as a basis for disallowing advertising.9' The amount
that is spent on advertising, however, should reflect the competitive
pressures to which the firm must respond. Although a utility may
monopolize a particular service, it must confront the challenge posed
by substitutes for that service.2
This is particularly true for utilities that distribute energy.
Although a company may have a geographic monopoly on the
distribution of natural gas, it often must compete with an electric
utility or unregulated fuel oil vendors.9 3 This competition is frequently intense, and has been cited as justifying the amount of the
firm's advertising expense.'
Based upon the same logic, commissions have disallowed advertising outlays where the same utility provided both gas and electricity.95 A competitive firm does not ordinarily waste money in
91. See Kansas City Power & Light Co., 6 P.U.R.4th 259 (Kan. State Corp.
Comm'n 1974); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 75 (Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1974); Cleveland Elec. Illumination Co., 3 P.U.R.4th 259 (Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1973).
For court decisions affirming the right of utilities to advertise, see generally cases
cited notes 37, 48 supra. But see Los Angeles v. Public Utils. Comm'n, supra note 57,
wherein the court approved the disallowance of institutional advertising in part
because the utility was a monopoly with "captive consumers." I& at 800.
92. A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 15, at 140. For example, the
telephone faces some competition from the mails, telegraph, microwave, or even personal travel. "No one is an absolute monopolist since all goods are substitutable to
some degree. But degrees are important." Id. See also R. STANLEY, supra note 1, at 5.
In Promotional Practices of Elec. & Gas Utils., 65 P.U.R.3d 405 (Conn. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n 1966), the commission stated that the competition for space heating business
between gas and electric utilities made these businesses less than natural monopolies
in the traditional sense.
93. The efficacy of advertising to inspire selective demand and maintain the
firm's market share against alternative energy sources will depend in part on the
degree to which the service can be differentiated. R. STANLEY, supra note 1, at 4, 173.
"Thus, electric utilities proclaim the virtues of 'clean, flameless electric heat,' while
natural gas utilities propound the corresponding arguments in favor of gas heat." Utility Advertising, supra note 24, at 459.
94. See West Ohio Gas Co. v. Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm'n (No. 1), 294 U.S. 63
(1935); State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 254 N.C. 536, 119
S.E.2d 469 (1961); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 40 P.U.R.3d 209 (Ark. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1961); Southern Cal. Gas Co., 35 P.U.R.3d 300 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1960);
Union Elec. Co., 81 P.U.R.3d 85 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1969); Milwaukee v. Milwaukee
Gas Light Co., 92 P.U.R. (New Series) 133 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1952). But see In re
Hawaiian Elec. Co., 56 Hawaii 260, 535 P.2d 1102 (1975); Southern Cal. Edison Co., 90
P.U.R.3d 1 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1971), discussed at note 118, infra.
95. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 87 P.U.R.3d 270 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1971);
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 26 P.U.R.3d 129 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1958); MontanaDakota Utils. Co., 22 P.U.R.3d 505 (N.D. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1958).
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order to foster competition between its own departments. There is,
moreover, evidence which shows that combined gas and electric
utilities nationwide generally advertise less than utilities which
must compete with an alternative energy retailer."
Also relevant to a reasonable advertising policy is the ability of
the company to service the new demand generated by its promotional program. If a firm has as much business as it can handle,
money spent to increase consumption is wasted.17 The firm will be
unable to capitalize on the product of its advertising program. 8
The most apparent short-term limitation on a company's ability
to service new demand is existing plant capacity. Capacity problems
usually occur at electric or telephone utilities, although one decision
has expressed concern over the limited carrying capacity of the company's gas mains.9 Advertising by companies operating at or near
capacity has frequently been found unreasonable where the apparent effect of the advertising would be to increase peak load.1°1 In
one case the company had even been advertising to promote consumption at the same time that peak load problems were threatening service to existing users. '
Closely related to the factor of plant capacity is the inability of
some energy utilities to receive adequate fuel supplies. The problem
has become acute in recent years for some vendors of natural gas.
As a result of supply difficulties, the firm may be unable to service
96. Utility Advertising, supra note 24, at 461-62.
97. For example, where three thousand people were waiting to get
telephones, the commission disallowed further advertising to stimulate demand. Public
Utils. Comm'n v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 75 P.U.R. (New Series) 275 Me. Pub.
Utils. Comm'n 1948).
98. Obviously, an unregulated firm could capitalize on the increased demand
resulting from advertising by raising prices as well as by selling greater quantities. R.
STANLEY. supra note 1, at 6. This would be the ordinary response to capacity problems.
Utilities, however, do not have the discretion to raise their prices at will. To allow
them to do so because they were operating at capacity would thwart the entire purpose of rate regulation.
99. Boston Consol. Gas Co., 30 P.U.R. (New Series) 260 (Mass. Dep't of Pub.
Utils. 1939).
100. See Southern Cal. Edison Co., 90 P.U.R.3d 1 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n
1971); Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 95 P.U.R.3d 247 (Kan. State Corp. Comm'n 1972); Public
Utils. Com'n v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 80 P.U.R. (New Series) 397 (Me. Pub.
Utils. Commin 1949); New York Tel. Co., 92 P.U.R.3d 321 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1971); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 22 P.U.R.3d 505 (N.D. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1958);
Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 7 P.U.R.4th 470
(Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n 1974).
101. New York Tel. Co., supra note 100.
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increased demand regardless of the capacity of its plant. Advertising in the face of such difficulties has been held to be wasteful."'
Only advertising directly designed to promote consumption is
unreasonable for a firm limited by its peak load capacity. For example, it has been held that even though a company had more orders
for telephones than it could fill, the commission was without authority to disallow informational advertising directed at existing users. °3
The advertising was for the purpose of acquainting customers with
the use of party lines, directories, and the possibility of converting
from manual to dial instruments. The court, relying on West Ohio,
held that disallowing this program was an impermissible invasion of
management's prerogative to advertise.'
A problem with peak load capacity also should not inhibit
advertising off-peak use in order to achieve a more balanced load.'
Examples of this strategy include promoting long-distance calls at
night, gas air conditioning in the south and electric space heating in
the north."8 Load balancing has often been cited as a legitimate objective of advertising,'07 even where the commission has disapproved
promotional advertising in general."8 However, even promoting off102. See Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 95 P.U.R.3d 247 (Kan. State Corp. Comm'n
1974); Consumers Power Co., 3 P.U.R.4th 350 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974); New
York State Elec. & Gas Co., 93 P.U.R.3d 302 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1971); Public
Serv. Co. of N.C., 19 P.U.R.4th 109 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n 1977); Carolina Power & Light
Co., 88 P.U.R.3d 283 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n 1971); Narragansett Elec. Co., 93 P.U.R.3d
417 (R.I. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1972); Roanoke Gas Co., 96 P.U.R.3d 91 (Va. State Corp.
Comm'n 1972); Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 92 P.U.R. (New Series) 133
(Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1952). See also Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp., 92 P.U.R.3d 278,
298-99 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1971) (Chairman Eich, dissenting).
103. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 203 Ga. 832, 49
S.E.2d 38 (1948). See also New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 93 P.U.R.3d 302 (N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1971).
104. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, supra note 103, at
65-66.
105. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. Pacific Power & Light Co., supra
note 100.
106. Such promotion of off-peak use is based on the principle that as the company's utilization of capacity improves, the unit cost of providing service will decline.
Utility Advertising, supra note 24, at 458-59.
107. See Southern Cal. Gas Co., 35 P.U.R.3d 300 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n
1960); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 514 (Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n
1974); Kansas City Power & Light Co., 6 P.U.R.4th 321 (Kan. State Corp. Comm'n
1974); Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 15 P.U.R.4th 209 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 75 (Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974); Cleveland Elec.
Illumination Co., 3 P.U.R.4th 259 (Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1973).
108. See Alabama Power Co., 97 P.U.R.3d 371 (Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1972);
Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 13 P.U.R.4th 40 (Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1975); Penn-
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peak use will aggravate the problems of a utility having supply problems. Such advertising has been disallowed because it increases
overall consumption, thereby making fuel even more scarce. 1 9
All of the foregoing considerations are independent of any
judgment by the commission regarding the intrinsic value or social
utility of the advertising message. Rather, they are based on attempts to define reasonableness objectively as an advertising program which is not wasteful and does not burden the consumer with
exploitive costs. While this objective remains a valid aspect of
regulatory review of advertising expenses, it has become relatively
less significant. State commissions have rapidly expanded their inquiry to include their opinion as to whether the advertising message
is desirable as a matter of public policy.
THE REQUIREMENT OF REASONABLENESS: NEW DIMENSIONS

In recent years a variety of policy considerations have exerted
a strong influence on the allowability of utility advertising. Commission decisions have reflected public concern over rising costs,
energy conservation, and environmental damage.10 As a result, the
overwhelming number of decisions in the last ten years have been
unfavorable towards utility advertising. The prerogative of management to select the advertising message has been greatly limited.This development is desirable if one considers the policies pursued
by the commissions to be of paramount importance. There remains,
however, the larger issue of whether commissions have the authority
to serve these policies by disallowing utility advertising.
Central to this discussion is the thesis that these changes have
occurred for reasons unrelated to the threat of monopolistic exploitation by the utility. Commissions are now disallowing advertising expenses because they disapprove of the content of the advertising. This occurs regardless of the amount spent by the utility, and in
the absence of any showing that the amount spent was unusually
large or inconsistent with the behavior of unregulated businesses
sylvania Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 96 P.U.R.3d 113 (Pa. Pub.
Utils. Comm'n 1972).
109. See Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 95 P.U.R.3d 247 (Kan. State Corp. Comm'n
1972); Narragansett Elec. Co., 93 P.U.R.3d 417 (R.I. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1972).
110. E.g., Promotional Practices of Electric Utilities, 8 P.U.R.4th 268 (Fla. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1975); Potomac Elec. Power Co., 10 P.U.R.4th 13 (Md. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1975); Michigan Power Co., 18 P.U.R.4th 418 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1977).
See generally Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern" Structural Change in the
Process of Public Utility Regulation, 17 J.L. & ECON. 291 (1974).
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which do not have a monopoly. These decisions omit any reference
to West Ohio or its progeny. They make no attempt to reconcile
their position with the principle that commissions may not simply
substitute their judgment for that of management.
Accordingly, the review of advertising now tends to center on
a discussion of whether a given type of advertising, in the opinion of
the commission, is of benefit to the ratepayer or the public at large.
Where no benefit is perceived,.the expense for that type of advertising is disallowed."' Advertising to promote energy consumption and
advertising to promote public goodwill have been the particular
targets of this treatment.
Advertising to Promote Energy Consumption
Until recently, advertising to promote energy consumption was
generally regarded as a proper activity of gas and electric utilities."'
Such advertising was presumed to contribute to a healthy growth of
the industry."' This attitude reflects the economics of a natural
monopoly."4 Increased consumption reduces the average unit cost of
service." 5 This means that as more energy is sold, the cost of
delivering that energy continually declines. As a result, advertising
to stimulate demand and increase consumption ultimately benefits
all consumers by making utility service cheaper." 6
111. E.g., Arkansas Power & Light Co., 15 P.U.R.4th 153 (Ark. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1976); Public Serv. Co. of N.C., 19 P.U.R.4th 109 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n 1977).
112. See West Ohio Gas Co. v. Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm'n (No. 1), 294 U.S. 63
(1935); City of El Dorado v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 235 Ark. 812, 362 S.W.2d
680 (1962); Central Maine Power Co. v. Maine Pub. Utfls. Comm'n, 153 Me. 228, 136
A.2d 726 (1957); State ex tel Dyer v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 S.W.2d 795
(Mo. 1960); State ex reL Utils. Comm'n v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 254 N.C. 536, 119
S.E.2d 469 (1961); Public Serv. Co. of N.H. v. State, 102 N.H. 150, 153 A.2d 801 (1959),
overruled, Public Serv. Co. of N.H. v. State, 113 N.H. 497, 311 A.2d 513 (1973); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 40 P.U.R.3d 209 (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1961); Southern Cal.
Gas Co., 35 P.U.R.3d 300 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1960); Union Elec. Co., 29 P.U.R.3d
254 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1959); Promotional Activities By Gas & Elec. Corps., 68
P.U.R.3d 162 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1967); Pennslyvania Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 14 P.U.R.3d 438 (Pa. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1956); Utah
Power & Light Co., 95 P.U.R. (New Series) 390 (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1952).
113. E.g., West Ohio Natural Gas Co. v. Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm'n (No. 1), supra
note 112, at 72.
114. See note 15 supra. For a decision following West Ohio and discussing the
economics of energy utilities, see Promotional Practices of Elec. & Gas Utils., 65
P.U.R.3d 405 (Conn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1966). This opinion deals primarily with promotional practices other than advertising.
115. See Public Service Co. of N.H. v. State, supra note 112; State v. Oklahoma
Gas & Elec. Co., 536 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1975); Utah Power & Light Co., supra note 112.
116. El Dorado v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, supra note 112.
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With few exceptions," 7 this position has been abandoned since
the energy crisis became an issue of national prominence. Recent
decisions have almost unanimously condemned advertising which
promotes energy consumption in order to endorse the national
policy in favor of energy conservation." 8
Promotional advertising by telephone companies continues to receive support
from some commissions, so long as the advertising is not merely an attempt to improve the corporate image. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 514 (Colo.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 19 P.U.R.4th 1 (Kan. State Corp.
Comm'n 1977); Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 15 P.U.R.4th 209 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1976); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 15 P.U.R.4th 289 (S.D. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1976). But
see Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 55 Ill.
2d 461, 303 N.E.2d 364
(1973); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 3 P.U.R.4th 486 (S.D. Pub. Utils. Comm'n), aff'd, 3
P.U.R.4th 473 (S.D. 6th Cir. 1974). The logic offered in support of advertising in these
cases is identical to that used to justify promotional advertising by energy utilities
prior to the energy crisis. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has held that both institutional and promotional advertising by a telephone company are allowable. New
England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., supra note 50.
117. State v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., supra note 115. See also, Northern
States Power Co., 6 P.U.R.4th 38 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974), affg Otter Tail
Power Co., 87 P.U.R.3d 204 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970).
Commissions in a few other jurisdictions continue to honor judicial precedent in
favor of promotional advertising by utilities. Ohio has abided by the West Ohio decision despite challenges based on conservation and environmental considerations.
Cleveland Elec. Illumination Co., 3 P.U.R.4th 259 (Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1973). In
Massachusetts, the commission is bound by New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dep't of
Pub. Utils., supra note 50. See Boston Gas Co., 12 P.U.R.4th 405 (Mass. Dep't of Pub.
Utils. 1975); Boston Edison Co., 99 P.U.R.3d 417 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Utils. 1973). In
other jurisdictions where the state supreme court has held such advertising to be
generally allowable, some decisions indicate that the company has discontinued the
practice, apparently of its own choice. See Central Me. Power Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 277
(Me. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1975); The Gas Service Co., 6 P.U.R.4th 99 (Mo. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1974).
118. See, e.g., -In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 56 Hawaii 260, 535 P.2d 1102 (1975);
Public Serv. Co. of N.H. v. State, 113 N.H. 497, 311 A.2d 513 (1973); Alabama Power
Co., 97 P.U.R.3d 371 (Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1972); Southern Cal. Edison Co., 100
P.U.R.3d 257 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1973); Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 13 P.U.R.4th 40
(Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1975); Promotional Practices of Elec. Utils., 8 P.U.R.4th 268
(Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975); Gasco Inc., 14 P.U.R.4th 561 (Hawaii Pub. Utils.
Comm'n 1976); Michigan Power Co., 18 P.U.R.4th 418 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1977);
Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 1 P.U.R.4th 229 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973);
Southern Union Gas Co., 12 P.U.R.4th 219 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975); Rochester
Gas & Elec. Corp., 14 P.U.R.4th 475 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976); Iroquois Gas
Corp., 91 P.U.R.3d 511 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1971); Duke Power Co., 7 P.U.R.4th
239 (N.C. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1974); Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 393 (Ore. Pub.
Util. Comm'r 1974); Pennsylvania Pub. Utils Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 96
P.U.R.3d 113 (Pa. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1972); Wisconsin Fuel & Light Co., 4 P.U.R.4th
368 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973).
Some decisions have attacked the rationale that energy utilities need to advertise in order to compete with an alternative energy supplier. It is argued that such
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The use of ratemaking as a tool to support a national energy
policy must be carefully distinguished from the fuel supply problems
discussed earlier. The energy crisis is a public policy which prevents
' 9
fuel suppliers from acquiring "windfall profits.""
Fuel prices are
therefore held at less than market equilibrium, and shortages are
the inevitable result."z Thus energy shortages are an undesirable
by-product of the political decision to hold energy prices at an artificially low level. 1 An emphasis on energy conservation attempts
to alleviate this problem.
If a company is individually affected by an inability to acquire
more fuel at existing prices, then advertising to stimulate increased
consumption is wasted because the company will be unable to serve
that demand.1' On the other hand, where advertising is disallowed
without any showing that the company is limited by supply problems, the commission is imposing a public policy on the firm. Competitive businesses, such as gas stations, will not generally stop procompetition does not benefit the ratepayer because the electric and gas companies
simply advertise to a standstill, i.e., the advertising of each simply nullifies the advertising of the other. See In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., supra. Thus each company in turn
may seek to have an ever higher advertising budget approved in order to gain an advantage, thereby "whipsawing" an unjustifiably high and essentially useless expense
item into the rate structure. See Southern Cal. Edison Co., 90 P.U.R.3d 1, 17 (Cal. Pub.
Utils. Comm'n 1971). This reasoning does not independently justify disallowing all promotional advertising. Of course, if the expense is unreasonably high by any objective
standard, an adjustment should be made. However, the logic offered in these cases ignores the fact that defensive advertising is common in unregulated industries where
the government finds no compelling reason to intervene in order to protect the consumer's pocketbook. Moreover, even if the advertising by a utility does only tend to
offset the efforts of its rival and has no appreciable effect on its market share, the consumer benefits at least by having been encouraged to make an informed choice between the available alternatives. The fundamental reason for the disallowances in
these cases is to conform the utility's advertising program to national energy policy,
and not because competitive advertising involves bad business judgment.
119. As the White House has stated:
In 1973-74, the oil-producing countries raised the world oil prices fourfold.
Deregulation of oil and gas prices would make U.S. producers the
beneficiaries of those arbitrary price rises, and yield windfall profits from
the increased value of oil and gas in existing fields. The producers have
no equitable claim to that enhanced value because jt is unrelated to their
activities or economic contributions.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT -ENERGY

ENERGY PLAN 50

POLICY AND PLANNING, THE NATIONAL

(1977).

120. Utility Advertising, supra note 24, at 459.
121. For a discussion of the relationship between price controls, shortages, and
economic rent (often pejoratively referred to as windfall profit), see, e.g., A. ALCHIAN
& W. ALLEN. supra note 15, at 88, 111-12.
122. See note 102 supra, and accompanying text.
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moting sales in order to endorse an energy conservation ethic.
However, if gas is in short supply and cars are lined up waiting to
buy it, promotional activities by gas station owners are unlikely.
The politics of energy is not at issue here, nor is the wisdom of
national energy policy questioned. It is apparent, however, that the
problem lies with finite supplies of fossil fuels and not with an attempt by utilities to exploit their monopolistic advantage. It is fuel
producers, and not utilities, that reap the benefits of high fuel
prices. Utilities simply pass the cost along to the public.
Therefore, a commission decision which relies on an energy
conservation ethic generally, rather than on a showing of tangible supply problems affecting the particular firm, is based on policies which
have no direct relationship to the utility or its monopolistic position.
Instead, a public policy external to the operation of the company is imposed on its private owners in the form of control over the firm's
advertising policy.
In many cases this distinction is probably one of form rather than
substance. Where advertising has been disallowed because of a
generalized desire to conserve energy, it is likely that the commission
could easily have recorded a finding that the particular firm was anticipating difficulty in acquiring sufficient fuel to meet increased demand."'3 This is especially true if the commission may look beyond the
immediately foreseeable future. Some cases indicate that the utility is
cooperating with the emphasis on conservation, presumably for this
reason."4 On the other hand, several decisions have disallowed promotional advertising even where the opinion indicates that the utility had
access to sufficient fuel and could serve the increased demand. 2 '
The desire to conserve fossil fuels is not the only policy which
has been cited as justifying the disallowance of promotional adver123. The cases cited in note 118 do not refer to such evidence in the record. Instead they appear to justify their policy on the energy crisis in general.
124. See Promotional Practices of Electric Utils., 8 P.U.R.4th 268 (Fla. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1975); The Gas Service Co., 6 P.U.R.4th 99 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1974); Long Island Lighting Co., 9 P.U.R.4th 21 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975);
Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 7 P.U.R.4th 470
(Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n 1974).
125. "Load building activities are peculiarly inappropriate when gas energy is
in short supply onla national basis. Although the Michigan Wisconsin system may be
in a better supply system than many, we must regard conservation as the dominant
theme of any reasonable gas policy-federal or state." Wisconsin Gas Co., 99 P.U.R.3d
160, 163-64 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973). See also Michigan Power Co., 18 P.U.R.4th
418, 426 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1977); Southern Union Gas Co., 12 P.U.R.4th 219
(N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
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tising. Some jurisdictions have also expressed concern over the
undesirable environmental effects caused by the generation,
distribution, or consumption of energy.126
Economists recognize the environmental problems associated
with productive activities as external costs. Costs are externalized
by a firm when they can be effectively shifted onto society as a
whole, rather than being paid for by the firm and passed along in
the price of the product. Pollution is a classic example of this problem of externalities, inasmuch as the general public bears the
burden of pollution rather than the firm which caused it."2
Any firm, regardless of whether it is a monopolist, has an obvious incentive to shift costs onto the public in order to decrease its
own costs. The public may respond with legislation to internalize
these costs by, for example, requiring pollution control equipment.
The decision to internalize a cost is difficult because the price eventually reflects the expense and is paid for by consumers. Moreover,
the activity of the company may involve external benefits as well as
costs. These benefits will be reduced if the price rises, causing demand and production to fall. This is particularly true of energy
utilities, where the relationship between energy production and
economic health has long been recognized.128 It may be necessary to
trade off clean air for jobs.
Accordingly, a few decisions have allowed advertising by public
29
utilities to promote industrial development in their service areas.
Some of these allowances were made despite language in the same
opinions disallowing advertising to promote energy consumption
generally." The anomaly is apparent, inasmuch as industrial
development must necessarily increase the overall demand for
power. The contradiction arises from a desire to conserve energy
126. See In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., supra note 118; Southern Cal. Edison Co., 90
P.U.R.3d 1 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1971); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 87 P.U.R.3d 270
(Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1971); Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 13 P.U.R.4th 40 (Colo. Pub.
Utils. Comm'n 1975); Promotional Practices of Elec. Utils., 8 P.U.R.4th 268 (Fla. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1975).
127. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 3, at 193-95.
128. Id.
129. See Alabama Power Co., 97 P.U.R.3d 371 (Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1972);
Consumers Power Co., 38 P.U.R.3d 355 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1961); Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 36 P.U.R.3d 289 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1960); Rochester Gas & Elec.
Co., 14 P.U.R.4th 475 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976).
130. Alabama Power Co., supra note 129; Rochester Gas & Elec. Co., supra
note 129.
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while simultaneously preserving the external benefits of energy production.
The trade-off between the external costs and benefits of energy
proddction is a difficult policy question involving a compromise between competing values. However, the issue is unrelated to the fact
that utilities are monopolies. The problem is identical when applied
to unregulated businesses. 31 Despite this, utilities are being required to conform their advertising messages to the policy decisions
of the commissions.
Another reason appearing in some commission decisions to
justify the disallowance of promotional advertising expenses is a
concern for the general inflationary trend of costs. Advertising
budgets are cut simply because of a desire to economize in the face
of higher costs elsewhere.'32 These opinions do not hold that the
advertising outlay is the result of waste or inefficiency by management."' Rather they are the product of a vague consumerist sentiment. One student of the ratemaking process has observed that
"many laymen somehow believe that they may be able to stop all
prices from rising except their own wages, with appropriate
action." 134 Advertising is therefore disallowed because it is not
directly related to providing utility service. 3 '
Regardless of the merits of this policy, it has no bearing on the
question of monopolistic exploitation. Any firm will eventually have
to raise its prices in order to cover increased costs for plant, equipment, supplies and labor. The government does not ordinarily intervene by preventing the company from passing advertising costs
along to consumers in order to combat inflation. A commission that
disallows an otherwise reasonable advertising expense in order to
131. 1 A. KAHN, supra note 3, at 194.
132. See Public Serv. Co. of N.H. v. State, 113 N.H. 497, 311 A.2d 513 (1973);
Southern Cal. Edison Co., 90 P.U.R.3d 1 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1971); Promotional
Practices of Elec. Utils., 8 P.U.R.4th 268 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975); Michigan Consol. Gas. Co., 1 P.U.R.4th 229 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1973); Detroit Edison Co., 3
P.U.R.4th 209 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974); Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th
393 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'r 1974).
133. "Waste" is used here to mean that the amount of the expense was
unreasonably high, rather than that the content of the advertising was without merit.
134. Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concerns: Structural Change in the
Process of Public Utility Regulation, supra note 110, at 313.
135. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 55 Ill.
2d 461,
303 N.E.2d 364 (1973), dealing with both promotional and institutional advertising by a
telephone company. In that case it was expressly found that the cost of the advertising
was not excessive or improper.
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offset increased costs elsewhere is directly substituting its business
judgment for that of the utility's managers.
Where promotional advertising is disallowed, the commission
usually allows or encourages the utility to advertise in favor of
energy conservation.1 36 This policy also extends to allowances for
advertisements dealing with environmental problems when promotional advertising has been disallowed because of environmental con37
cerns.
It is thus apparent that advertising by privately owned utilities
has become subject to the value judgments and policy decisions of
state commissions. The commissions are selecting the topics of advertising they consider desirable, and disallowing all others. Tis is Oeing done to serve policies which are independent of concern that the
utility may be exploiting its monopolistic advantage to the detriment of consumers. There is accordingly no apparent reason why
utility advertising should be uniquely subject to these policies.
Advertising which is designed to promote a favorable public image
for the company, rather than to stimulate demand, has met with
similar treatment.
Advertising to Promote Public Goodwill
Many companies, whether regulated or not, seek to favorably
influence public opinion towards the firm or towards issues in which
the firm has an interest." Institutional advertising 39 is particularly
136. See, e.g., Southern Cal. Edison Co., 100 P.U.R.3d 257 (Cal. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n 1973); Promotional Practices of Elec. Utils., 8 P.U.R.4th 268 (Fla. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1975); National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 17 P.U.R.4th 138 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1976); Public Serv. Co. of N.C., 19 P.U.R.4th 109 (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1977);
Southern Union Gas Co., 12 P.U.R.4th 219 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975); Utility
Advertising, No. 76-467 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'r July 19, 1976); Washington Utils. &
Transp. Comm'n v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 4 P.U.R.4th 305 (Wash. Utils. & Transp.
Comm'n 1974); Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 4 P.U.R.4th 305 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1974).
137. See Southern Cal. Edison Co., 100 P.U.R.3d 257 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n
1973); Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 13 P.U.R.4th 40 (Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1975).
138. R. STANLEY. supra note 1, at 255-58.
139. According to the Leading National Advertisers and Publishers Information Bureau, advertising must perform one or more of the following objectives to be
classed as institutional:
1. It must educate, inform, or impress the public regarding the
company's policies, functions, facilities, objectives, ideals and standards.
2. It must build favorable opinion about the company by stressing the
competence of the company's management, its scientific know-how,
manufacturing skills, technological progress and product improvements,
and contributions to social advancement and public welfare; and, on the
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important to utilities because of the natural hostility which a consumer feels towards a firm he did not select and which "presents
him with a substantial monthly bill which increases year-to-year as
his total annual consumption and (in some cases) rates increase." 4 '
Institutional advertising may also be important to a utility simply because it is a regulated business. Public opinion that is
favorable to the firm may be sought in order to give the utility increased leverage in proceedings before the commission.' 1 It has
been demonstrated that advertising may effectively reduce consumer complaints about the utility to the commission." 2 If such tactics result in a higher rate of return for the stockholders than is
otherwise justifiable, it is clearly an attempt by the firm to profit
from its status as a regulated monopoly.' 3
Therefore, advertising by utilities that is a political attempt to
influence a rate case has usually been disallowed.'
One court explained that the receipts of a utility were to be treated as a public
trust, and not used to acquire further rate increases. 4 ' The commissioners represented the public, and it was to them that the company
should direct its appeals. 4 '
It should be observed, however, that in some of these cases the
commission did not rely on a criticism of the advertising message.
Instead, the advertising was disallowed because the expense was abnormal or nonrecurring and therefore should not be incorporated into the future rate structure.'47 Even this view was not universal.
other hand, must offset unfavorable publicity and negative attitudes.
3. It must build up the investment qualities of its securities, to improve
the financial structure of the company.
4. It must sell the company as a good place to work (and so is often
designed to appeal to college graduates or to people of certain skills).
Id at 255.
140. Utility Advertising, supra note 24, at 459.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Such a rate of return would be greater than the firm's cost of capital. Id
144. See Fort Smith v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 220 Ark. 70, 247 S.W.2d 474
(1952); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 239 La. 175, 118
So. 2d 372 (1960); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 4 P.U.R.3d 195 (Ala. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1954); Public Utils. Comm'n v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 80 P.U.R. (New
Series) 397 (Me. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1949); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 78 P.U.R. (New
Series) 97 (N.J. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1949).
145. Fort Smith v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., supra note 144.
146. Id.
147. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, supra note
144; New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., supra note 144. There is, however, some measure of
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Some decisions took the extraordinarily lenient viewpoint that the
utility was entitled to "present its case in the newspapers," at the
public's expense, while the matter of rates was being determined.'48
Advertising which was not directed at a rate proceeding but
simply designed to encourage good customer relations 4 ' was, until
recently, generally accepted.50 It was considered not only desirable,
but obligatory that the firm "maintain a contact with the economic
and social life of the area it serves."'' In Wisconsin, the commission
similarly observed that institutional advertising is "even more
necessary with respect to public utility enterprises because of their
importance in the economic, industrial and social well-being of all individuals and enterprises and because of their existence in the
public interest.""' Earlier cases which questioned the value of such
advertising generally limited themselves to warning or admonishing
the utility to scrutinize such expenses carefully."
disapproval regarding the advertising message implicit in these disallowances. If a
commission considers an abnormal or nonrecurring expense to be meritorious, it may
incorporate the expense into the rate structure by providing that it be amortized over
a period of time. Compare Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 33 P.U.R. (New Series) 393
(N.Y. Dep't of Pub. Utils. 1940) (expense of World's Fair exhibit disallowed), with
Pacific Power & Light Co., 34 P.U.R.3d 36 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'r 1960) (expense connected with Oregon Centennial Exposition amortized over five years).
148. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Cincinnati, 75 P.U.R. (New Series) 97, 107
(Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1948). See also New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 83 P.U.R. (New
Series) 414 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1950), where the commission allowed the expense
even though the propriety of such advertising was questioned.
149. This distinction has been explicitly recognized in the course of allowing institutional advertising. See Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 41 P.U.R.3d 305 (N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1961).
150. See Central Me. Power Co. v. Maine Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 153 Me. 228, 136
A.2d 726 (1957); New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., 360 Mass. 443,
275 N.E.2d 493 (1971); State v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 536 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1975);
Alabama Power Co., 97 P.U.R.3d 371 (Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1972); Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co., 5 P.U.R.3d 396 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1954); Central Me. Power Co., 8 P.U.R.4th
277 (Me. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1975); Union Elec. Co., 29 P.U.R.3d 254 (Mo. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1959); Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 73 P.U.R.3d 417 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1968); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'r v. York Water Co., 78 P.U.R.3d 113
(Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'r 1968); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 90 P.U.R. (New Series)
107 (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1951); Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 9 P.U.R.4th 204 (Wis.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
151. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'r v. York Water Co., supra note 150, at
134.
152. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., supra note 150, at 210.
153. See Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 23 P.U.R.3d 209 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n
1958); New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 83 P.U.R. (New Series) 414 (Vt. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1950).
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Few decisions in recent years have continued to support the
discretion of utility management to enhance the public image of the
firm. Instead, institutional advertising is routinely disallowed on the
basis that it serves only the interests of the stockholders and is of no
benefit to the ratepayer.15 ' Most commissions simply assert this
without explanation, in the same manner in which institutional
advertising was formerly assumed to be beneficial. A few decisions
have ventured the opinion that the utility should rely on good,
cheap and efficient service in order to curry favor with the public, 55
disregarding the fact that the public will probably ignore or be
unaware of such service unless it is brought to their attention."
154. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 7 Cal. 3d 331, 497 P.2d 785,
102 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 55 Ill. 2d
461, 303 N.E.2d 364 (1973); Public Serv. Co. of N.H. v. State, 113 N.H. 497, 311 A.2d
513 (1973); Arkansas Power & Light Co., 15 P.U.R.4th 153 (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1976); Connecticut Light & Power Co., 2 P.U.R.3d 379 (Conn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1953);
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 P.U.R.3d 1 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1972); Public Serv. Co.
of Colo., 13 P.U.R.4th 40 (Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1975); General Tel. Co. of Fla., 19
P.U.R.4th 227 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1977); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 19 P.U.R.4th
1 (Kan. State Corp. Comm'n 1977); Potomac Elec. Power Co., 10 P.U.R.4th 13 (Md. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1975); Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 15 P.U.R.4th 209 (Mich. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1976); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 16 P.U.R.4th 207 (Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1976); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 18 P.U.R.4th 27 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976); Montana Power Co., 96 P.U.R.3d 265 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1972); Cornhusker State
Tel. Co., 13 P.U.R.4th 314 (Neb. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976); Southern Union Gas Co., 12
P.U.R.4th 219 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975); New Rochelle Water Co., 7 P.U.R.4th 86
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974); Duke Power Co., 7 P.U.R.4th 239 (N.C. Pub. Utils.
Comm'n 1974); Northern States Power Co., 6 P.U.R.4th 38 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1974); Utility Advertising, No. 76-467 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'r July 19, 1976); General
Tel. Co. of the Southeast, 13 P.U.R.4th 24 (S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 15 P.U.R.4th 289 (S.D. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1976); Wis. Power &
Light Co., 4 P.U.R.4th 305 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974).
In Iowa it has been determined that institutional advertising benefits both
ratepayers and stockholders. Therefore the cost is split between them. E.g., Iowa Elec.
Light & Power Co., 2 P.U.R.4th 288 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1973); North Central Pub. Serv. Co., 99 P.U.R.3d 432 (Iowa State Commerce Comm'n 1973).
155. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 34 P.U.R.3d 1 (N.C. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1960),
rev'd, State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 254 N.C. 536, 119
S.E.2d 469 (1961); Portland General Elec. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 393 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'r
1974). See also In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 56 Hawaii 260, 535 P.2d 1102 (1975) (promotional advertising).
156. One of the primary purposes of institutional advertising is to inform
customers of the quality of the service which the company offers, and the value of the
company as a member of the community. See note 139 supra. For example, in Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 P.U.R.3d 1 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1972), some of the advertising
concerned descriptions of employee helpfulness. The commission considered it of no
benefit to the consumer because this message was not sufficiently informative. I& at
10-11. See also Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 13 P.U.R.4th 40 (Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n
1975).
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The view that institutional advertising is of no tangible benefit
to the consumer is true at least to the extent that the value of institutional advertising is speculative. It is impossible to measure the
effects of a public relations effort with any degree of certainty.1 5 A
benefit has been found in the past based on the belief that such
advertising helps to attract investment capital and market the
firm's securities.'58 This reduces the cost of financing to the firm
when it seeks new funds, a saving which theoretically can be passed
along as lower rates. Other cases have held that institutional advertising helps to recruit employees 159 or reduces the cost of answering
customers' questions. 6 ' Moreover, it is not unreasonable to suppose
that a reduction in negative attitudes towards the utility will reduce
losses in such areas as theft of utility service, bad debts and vandalism. These are all acknowledged objectives of institutional advertising which motivate unregulated businesses to spend money in this
area. ' 1 The value of such programs is predominantly a matter of
business judgment. Nevertheless, most commissions today are
unpersuaded that utility customers should pay for such advertising.
In particular, the argument that institutional advertising is
beneficial because it attracts investment capital has failed to prevent disallowance of the expense." 2
Some commissions have supported their disapproval of institutional advertising by suggesting that such advertising is only an indirect attempt to influence rate cases by securing the public's acquiescence in another rate increase. 1 It should be observed,
157. R. STANLEY, supra note 1, at 248.
158. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., supra note 150;
Alabama Power Co., 97 P.U.R.3d 371 (Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1972); Southern Cal. Gas
Co., 35 P.U.R.3d 300 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1960); Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y.,
73 P.U.R.3d 417 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1968).
159. See Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 5 P.U.R.3d 396 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1954);
New York Tel. Co., 84 P.U.R.3d 321 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970); Pennsylvania Pub.
Util. Comm'r v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 93 P.U.R.3d 13 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'r 1971).
160. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 87 P.U.R.3d 270 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1971)
(questions concerning the company's environmental commitment); Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co., supra note 159.
161. See notes 138, 139 supra.
162. See General Tel. Co. of Fla., 19 P.U.R.4th 227 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1977); Cornhusker State Tel. Co., 13 P.U.R.4th 314 (Neb. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976).
Oregon, however, has excepted institutional advertising specifically designed for investors or potential employees from its general policy of disallowing institutional
advertising. See Utility Advertising, No. 76-467 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'r July 19, 1976).
163. See Northern States Power Co., 11 P.U.R.4th 385 (Minn. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1975); Southern Union Gas Co., 12 P.U.R.4th 219 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1975).
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however, that the public does not grant or refuse a request for increased rates. The commission itself is responsible for this decision,
and will presumably rule on the basis of criteria independent of the
firm's advertising. Given the hostility of many consumers towards
utilities, it is unlikely that institutional advertising will generate
public goodwill sufficiently fervent to coerce a commission into approving unreasonably high rates.
Thus, the argument that advertising to promote public goodwill
is merely a disguised attempt to influence a rate case is indefensible. It does not justify depriving the utility of an allowance for
reasonable expenses to maintain a good relationship with its
customers, even in the face of rising rates. Where the costs for this
type of advertising are unreasonably high, the commission may
always take corrective action. 6 '
Like promotional advertising, institutional advertising has
sometimes been criticized because the commission is concerned
generally with rising prices.' 5 The advertising budget is therefore
sacrificed regardless of whether the expense in itself was
reasonable. Some decisions also state that such advertising only aggravates consumers who must pay more for utility service. ' " This
comment is made without the support of any showing that institutional advertising is generally ineffective in securing good customer
relations.
Institutional advertising is sometimes directed at a specific
issue of importance to the utility rather than the image of the firm
in general. Where such advertising takes on a political character,
commissions have generally been hostile. For example, several commissions have disallowed advertising designed to justify private instead of public ownership of utilities.'7 One court, however, allowed
some expense for this purpose as advertising generally within the
164. E.g., New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., supra note 150.
165. See Promotional Practices of Elec. Utils., 8 P.U.R.3d 268 (Fla. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1975); Potomac Elec. Power Co., 10 P.U.R.4th 13 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1975); Duke Power Co., 7 P.U.R.4th 239 (N.C. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1974); Portland Gen.
Elec. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 393 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'r 1974); Wisconsin Power & Light Co.,
4 P.U.R.4th 305 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974).
166. See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 55 Ill. 2d 461, 303
N.E.2d 364 (1973); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 87 P.U.R.3d 270 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n
1971); Potomac Elec. Power Co., 10 P.U.R.4th 13 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975); New
Rochelle Water Co., 7 P.U.R.4th 86 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974).
167. See Consumers Power Co., 29 P.U.R.3d 133 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1959); Pacific Power & Light Co., 34 P.U.R.3d 36 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'r 1960); Utah
Power & Light Co., 95 P.U.R. (New Series) 390 (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1952).
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realm of management discretion. ' " More recently, some commissions
have held advertising on behalf of nuclear power allowable.169
Oregon, however, has found such a campaign to be of questionable
value and has disallowed it. 7°
The hostility being exhibited towards institutional advertising
does not extend to messages which are not issue-oriented or which
are neutral with respect to the utility's image. The result is that
utilities are being confined to advertising objective facts concerning
such matters as safety, bill computation, and available services.
Such messages are deemed of sufficient worth by the commission,
and allowed as informational advertising which is of some tangible
benefit to the consumer."'
From the foregoing it is apparent that advertising by utilities
to gain the goodwill of their customers is being disallowed on the
basis of the commission's arbitrary opinion concerning the intrinsic
value of the advertising message. Such judgments occur despite the
fact that the advertising program may have been similar to that of
unregulated and more competitive businesses. They are unrelated to
the problems posed by the company's monopolistic advantage. 7 '
168. See State ex reL Dyer v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 341 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1960).
169. Central Maine Power Co., 15 P.U.R.4th 455 (Me. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1976);
Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 14 P.U.R.4th 475 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976); Wisconsin
Elec. Power Co., 9 P.U.R.4th 204, 219-20 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975) (Chairman
Cudahy, concurring).
170. See Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 393 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'r
1974). See also Rochester Gas & Elec. Co., supra note 169, at 487-88 (Comm'r Berlin,
dissenting).
171. See Los Angeles v. Public Utils. Comm'n, supra note 154; Illinois Bell Tel.
Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, supra note 154; Arkansas Power & Light Co., 15
P.U.R.4th 153 (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 87 P.U.R.3d 270
(Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1971); Promotional Practices of Elec. Utils., 8 P.U.R.4th 268
(Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975); Consumers Power Co., 14 P.U.R.4th 1 (Mich. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1976); Southern Union Gas Co., 12 P.U.R.4th 219 (N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1975); Iroquois Gas Corp., 91 P.U.R.3d 511 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1971); North
Carolina Natural Gas Corp., 99 P.U.R.3d 237 (N.C. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1973); Otter Tail
Power Co., 87 P.U.R.3d 204 (N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970); Pennsylvania Pub. Util.
Comm'r v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 93 P.U.R.3d 13 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'r 1971); Wisconsin
Power & Light Co., 4 P.U.R.4th 305 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974).
172. In Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 95 P.U.R.3d 1 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1972),
the advertising was disallowed even though it was explicitly found that the expense
was reasonable as a percentage of revenues. See also Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois
Commerce Comm'n, supra note 154. Oregon recognized the reasonableness of the total
expense as an entirely separate consideration from that of whether the type of advertising is allowable. See Utility Advertising, No. 76467 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'r July 19,
1976).
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These decisions appear to be based on an unwillingness by commissioners to defer to the business judgment of utility managers, or to
make the equally arbitrary assumption that institutional advertising
actually provides ratepayers with some tangible benefit.
The disallowance of both promotional and institutional advertising in modern commission decisions represents a desire on the part
of these agencies to judge the social utility of the advertising. This
trend is emphasized by the selective allowance of advertising to conserve energy, promote environmental awareness, encourage industrial development, or disseminate facts considered by the commission to be informational. These decisions represent an expansion
of the commissions' role in reviewing advertising expenses as they
have responded to policies that had not developed at the time of the
West Ohio decision. In the process, the presumption that management has exercised good faith in their advertising decisions has
been abandoned.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF

The mechanism for achieving greater commission control over
the advertising policy of public utilities has been a shifting of the
burden of proof. This has occured notwithstanding the prohibition of
West Ohio and its successors, which required the commission to
presume the expense was reasonable and show the opposite with
evidence before a disallowance could be made.
As a general principle, the utility has the initial burden of proof
when it seeks to justify a rate increase. This has been explained
as arising from the utility's trust relationship with the public, and
from its superior funds, organization and access to pertinent
records."' West Ohio limited the utility's duty by establishing that,
once the firm has shown that the expense was paid, the burden
rests with the commission to show that the cost was unnecessary or
wasteful.'74 In that case, the commission's disallowance of the expen75
diture had "no basis in evidence, either direct or circumstantial."
The Court therefore struck down the decision because it was unsupported by anything other than the commission's opinion about
advertising.
173. See El Dorado v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 213 Ark. 812, 362 S.W.2d
680 (1962).
174. 294 U.S. at 72.
175. Id.
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Recently this principle was recast by one court in more modern
evidentiary terms. The company must meet the burden of production and establish a prima facie case by showing that the expense
was actually incurred. The commission, however, has the burden of
the expense is
proving by substantial and competent evidence that
1 6
unreasonable because of inefficiency or bad faith. 1
Despite West Ohio, many jurisdictions have now indicated that
the company also has the burden of proving that the advertising
benefits the consumers.'77 This is a much greater duty than merely
showing that the expense was incurred and relying on the commission to rebut the presumption that management has acted in good
faith.
This reassignment of the burden of proof is most evident in the
area of institutional advertising. The decisions in this area are not
based on evidence. Instead they are based on assumptions as to
whether such advertising benefits the consumer or the stockholders.
Recent decisions assume that the consumer receives no tangible
benefit,' whereas commissions in the past have assumed a benefit
with equal facility.179 Inasmuch as commissions disallowing the expense are reasoning on the basis of an irrefutable value judgment,
the company cannot offer evidence in support of the advertising
other than that the expense was actually incurred. The assignment
of the burden of proof under such circumstances is determinative.
The "benefit to the consumer" test, when used in this manner, af176. Boise Water Corp. v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 97 Idaho 832, 555 P.2d
163 (1976). The decision also recognized that utilities have a heavier burden of proof
with respect to payments made to affiliated companies. A number of commission decisions show particular disapproval of expenses incurred by a local utility as its prorated share of a cooperative national advertising campaign. See Intermountain Gas
Co., 18 P.U.R.4th 79 (Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1976); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 16
P.U.R.4th 207 (Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976); New York Tel. Co., 92 P.U.R.3d 321
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1971); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 15 P.U.R.4th 289 (S.D.
Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1976); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 14 P.U.R.4th 149 (Wyo.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976). But see General Tel. Co. of Wis. v. Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
46 P.U.R.3d 1 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1962). in which the court called the commission
"picayunish" because it had disallowed the company's contribution to national advertising
by the General Telephone system. There had been no showing by the commission of
bad faith, inefficiency, or imprudence. Id. at 5.
177. See, e.g., In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 56 Hawaii 260, 535 P.2d 1102 (1975);
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 12 P.U.R.4th 252 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975); Intermountain Gas Co., 18 P.U.R.4th 79 (Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1976); Consumers Power
Co., 14 P.U.R.4th 1 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976); Northern States Power Co., 11
P.U.R.4th 385 (Minn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1975).
178. See note 154 supra.
179. See note 150 supra.
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fords the commission an opportunity to substitute its business judgment for that of management.
Significantly, almost all decisions which require the company to
show that its advertising has some intrinsic social value make no
reference to West Ohio. The few cases which acknowledge West
Ohio's existence and nevertheless disallow the expense because it is
deemed worthless do not actually resolve the issues raised by that
decision." Even if it is true that the advertising has no merit, there
remains a legitimate issue as to who must prove this and how it can
be done. West Ohio requires that the commission show waste with
evidence in the record. Therefore, in those jurisdictions where state
courts have followed West Ohio, some commissions have been bound
to pay due deference to management's discretion to select the
message it believes is desirable. 1 '
Placing the burden of proof upon the commission does not
mean that the utility's advertising expenses must go unchallenged.
It has been demonstrated that the commission has a great deal of
discretion in determining whether the level of the expense is excessive, and courts will invariably defer to the commission's expertise where their decision finds support in the record.'82 Nor is there
any question as to who must produce the evidence to resolve the
issue. The company will always have the responsibility of providing
the commission with all necessary data. However, where the commission must support its disallowance with competent evidence of
waste, it should be precluded from inhibiting management's
180. In Hartford v. Hartford Elec. Light Co., No. 112008 (Hartford County C.P.
March 31, 1976), the court reviewed a commission ruling which had expressly relied on
West Ohio in allowing advertising expenses. Judge Bieluch overruled the Supreme
Court with the observation that such reasoning is "outdated under present conditions."
Id. at 32. See also In re Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 3 P.U.R.4th 473 (S.D. Cir. Ct.
1974); Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 8 P.U.R.4th 393 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'r 1974).
181. See Central Me. Power Co., 15 P.U.R.4th 455 (Me. Pub. Utils. Comm'n
1976); New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 11 P.U.R.4th 297 (Mass. Dep't of Pub. Utils. 1975);
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 13 P.U.R.4th 268 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Board 1976). Ohio has
continued to adhere to the mandate of the West Ohio case. See Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 15
P.U.R.4th 344 (Ohio Pub. Utils. Comm'n 1976).
Elsewhere commissions are ignoring state court decisions in favor of utility
advertising as well as West Ohio. Compare El Dorado v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
supra note 173, with Arkansas Power & Light Co., 15 P.U.R.4th 153 (Ark. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1976); compare State ex reL Utilities Comm'n v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co.,
254 N.C. 536, 119 S.E.2d 469 (1961), with Duke Power Co., 7 P.U.R.4th 239 (N.C. Pub.
Utils. Comm'n 1974); compare State ex rel. Dyer v. Public Serv. Comm'n, supra note
168, with Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 18 P.U.R.4th 27 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1976).
182. Acker v. United States, 298 U.S. 426 (1936); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
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prerogative to advertise on the basis of simple assertions regarding
the value of institutional advertising."
The disallowance of promotional advertising raises more difficult questions, inasmuch as such advertising by energy utilities obviously contravenes important and universally recognized public
policies. There is no problem with the assignment of the burden of
proof if one assumes that utility advertising which conflicts with
public policy is unreasonable by definition. The state can regulate
firms affected with a public interest and place special duties upon
them. " ' It is necessary to inquire as to what the public interest is,
and what duties arise from it. More specifically, one must determine
the scope of the commission's statutory jurisdiction to regulate
rates.
THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Even if the current trend in commission decisions does not contravene West Ohio and raise constitutional issues, there remains a
problem with the scope of the commission's statutory mandate. It is
clear that modern regulators are dealing with issues which did not
confront their predecessors, and which had not arisen at the time of
the West Ohio decision. It is less clear that those issues are properly placed upon the agenda.
In the context of advertising expenses, there is a dearth of
authority on the policies which commissions are entitled to consider.
Only the Supreme Court of Oklahoma recognized the issue by
assuming for the sake of argument that the commission had jurisdiction over the energy crisis.'" Elsewhere there has merely been
reference to statutory language admonishing the commission to
regulate in the public interest. ' "
In NAACP v. Federal Power Commission, the Supreme Court
recently held that the phrase "public interest" is not all encompassing."" The Court rejected an attempt by the NAACP to incorporate
the goal of nondiscriminatory employment practices into the charter
of the Federal Power Commission. While the Court recognized that
this was an important national priority, it observed that it had in
183.
184.
185.
186.

New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Dep't bf Pub. Utils., supra note 150.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
State v. Oklahoma Gas & Elee. Co., 536 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1975).
E.g., Utility Advertising, No. 76-467 at 4 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'r July 19,

187.

425 U.S. 662 (1976).

1976).
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the past "consistently held that the words 'public interest' in a
regulatory statute is not a broad license to promote the general
welfare. Rather, the words take meaning from the purposes of the
regulatory legislation."'" In this case, the Power and Gas Acts did
not contain a directive to eradicate discrimination. " Only where
such discrimination had a pecuniary impact which bore directly on
the issue of just and reasonable rates would there be sufficient
nexus between the legislative purpose and the discriminatory practices to justify regulatory action.19
The purpose of regulating the rates of public utilities is to prevent monopolistic exploitation.1 9' Absent the belief that these
businesses are natural monopolies, there is no better reason to
regulate them than other large and economically important companies. Regulatory statutes were passed to assure adequate service
at nondiscriminatory and reasonable rates which balanced the interests of the public and the private owners of the utilities.'" They
were not designed to make these industries uniquely responsible for
promoting every public policy.
NAACP v. Federal Power Commission, if applied to utility
regulation, indicates that where such issues as the energy crisis are
unrelated to the purpose of regulating utility rates, the commission
is without authority to disallow advertising for that reason. If,
however, the energy crisis has a direct pecuniary impact on the
usefulness of advertising, then the commission may act. For example, the national energy policy may create fuel shortages which
make an individual utility unable to service new demand. Promotional advertising under such circumstances is a waste of money. "
On the other hand, if the firm can service new demand, a
disallowance based only on the commission's desire to endorse the
national energy conservation ethic may be beyond the commission's
statutory jurisidiction. This follows from the fact that the regulatory
legislation was not enacted for the purpose of conserving energy,
and such a goal can not be casually extracted from the phrase
"public interest."
Despite this logic, advertising by utilities is now routinely
disallowed to serve broad social goals which are entirely unrelated
188. Id.at 669.
189. They do, however, explicitly grant authority to consider conservation and
environmental questions. Id at 670 n.6.
190. Id. at 671.
191. See note 13 supra.
192.

1 A.J.G. PRIEST. PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 1-5 (1969).

193.

See note 102 supra
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to the problem of monopoly power in these industries. This is particularly true of promotional advertising by energy utilities, where
not only the energy crisis' 9 ' but inflation'95 and environmental concerns'" have successfully intruded on management's traditional
prerogative to advertise. One may question whether the expertise of
the agency extends to such broad policy matters and justifies the
deference of the judiciary. The experience of the commission and its
staff with the industry may make them uniquely qualified to identify
an excessive expense, but it does not make them competent to
determine the appropriate response to inflation or to arbitrate the
competing values raised by environmental concerns.
The issue of whether the commission has statutory jurisdiction
to disallow advertising because of such policy considerations has not
been discussed in any opinion.' A challenge to the commission's
statutory authority should be decided on the basis of a careful consideration of its enabling legislation, and the practical value of using
the ratemaking mechanism to achieve these policies. Ultimately, the
decision will turn on the proper balance between public authority
and private rights.
CONCLUSION
The above discussion has emphasized two fundamental principles. First, the purpose of controlling a utility's advertising expense is to prevent monopolistic exploitation in the form of wasteful
costs. Second, the law forbids regulatory agencies from arbitrarily
substituting their judgment for that of management. The commission has the burden of proving that the expense was wasteful.
Where there is evidence in the record to support such a finding, a
court must defer to the expertise of the commission.
Regulatory commissions have developed standards that are
consistent with these principles in order to determine the
reasonableness of an advertising expense. An expenditure which
194. See note 118 supra.
195. See note 132 supra.
196. See note 126 supra.
197. The paucity of challenges by utilities to the commission's authority to
disallow advertising is possibly due to the fact that the utility does not actually lose
any money. It will simply stop incurring the expense. The utility loses the right to
advertise as it pleases, but the actual pecuniary loss is likely to fall on an advertising
agency. Most of the judicial discussion of the allowability of advertising expenses is appended to rulings on such issues as the scope of the rate base or the rate of return. A
utility is more likely to contest these issues because it has a direct financial interest in
the decision.
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compares unfavorably with that of similarly situated utilities may be
found unreasonable. Such comparisons must be fair, but they need
not approach mathematical perfection. Furthermore, considering the
expense in light of market factors which would affect the willingness of a competitive firm to advertise is consistent with traditional principles. Specifically, the competition from substitute services and the existence of capacity or supply problems may bear on
the reasonableness of a company's advertising expense.
Recent decisions have generally exhibited a greater willingness
to disallow advertising expenses. This has occurred because commissions have been reluctant to allow advertising that is inconsistent
with public policy on such matters as energy conservation and environmental concerns. Commissions have also cut advertising expenses in order to economize because of rising costs elsewhere, and
have not hesitated to substitute their business judgment for that of
management regarding the value of institutional advertising. These
decisions do not generally rely on any showing that the amount
spent was wasteful. Instead, they are based on value judgments as
to whether the advertising message is socially desirable.
This trend is easily defensible on the basis of the results
achieved. Consumers have certainly been spared costs for advertising campaigns which are perceived by many as contrary to the
general welfare or, at best, of dubious benefit to the public.1 Such
logic presupposes, however, that government intervention into
private decisions is necessarily justified when the object of the intervention is widely regarded as desirable.
The Supreme Court has held that the right of a utility to
advertise is protected from arbitrary commission decisions unsupported by evidence that the amount spent was wasteful. The commissions are without constitutional authority to act upon a simple
substitution of their judgment for that of the managers of the utility. Moreover, because these decisions are unrelated to the dangers
posed by monopoly enterprise, one may question whether there is
any nexus between many disallowances and the purpose of the
statute which established the commission. Absent such a nexus, the
commission is without even statutory jurisdiction to oppose the
advertising.
198. See Note, Public Utilities: The Allowance of Advertising Expenditures
for Ratemaking Purposes-Is This Trip Really Necessary? 29 OKLA. L. REV. 202
(1976).
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These problems have generally not prevented state commissions from disallowing advertising expenses for any reason which
appeals to their sense of public spirit. The legality of this assumption of power is highly questionable, in view of the uncertain application of West Ohio under current circumstances and the absence
of explicit legislative guidance." 9 Such arbitrary expansion of
bureaucratic authority arguably offends the public interest more
than the advertising that has been repressed.
Michael A. Meyer

199. In Connecticut, the legislature has provided the commission express
authority to disallow all political, institutional and promotional advertising by gas and
electric utilities. See The Connecticut Natural Gas Corp., 11 P.U.R.4th 66 (Conn. Pub.
Utils. Comm'n 1975) (disallowing advertising concerning offshore drilling as political).
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